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1 | INTRODUCTION
How is personal identity affected by changes in the self over the
course of time? How does the experience of a severe mental disorder
impact on an individual's sense of self and personal identity? Do fluc-
tuations in the self affect culpability for their actions? These questions
are of interest to psychiatrists, philosophers, and legal scholars. How-
ever, all too often they are studied from within disciplinary silos.
We report on an interdisciplinary workshop that we organized, on
“Mental disorder and self over time.” The workshop took place on 1st
September, 2015, under the aegis of the European Research Council
project “Self‐Control and the Person: An inter‐disciplinary account.”
It followed in the footsteps of the Centre for the Humanities and
Health, which aimed to facilitate interdisciplinary engagement of clini-
cians and philosophers.1-5
We designed the workshop to be clinically relevant; approximately
half of the 41 participants were clinicians. We aimed to create a collab-
orative and exploratory atmosphere, bringing together participants
from mental health, philosophical, and legal backgrounds. This allowed
us to explore issues in the philosophy of personal identity as they
relate to the actual experience of mental disorder: to see what lessons
clinical experience might have for this area of philosophy and to get
philosophical input on questions of identity and selfhood that arise in
clinical practice.
Specific disorders have their own particular patterns, which can
affect sense of self and personal identity in different ways. The work-
shop was divided into six sessions, each focusing on a different disor-
der: dementia, affective disorders, bipolar, psychotic disorders,
borderline personality disorder, and anorexia nervosa. Each of these
sessions opened with a 25‐ to 30‐minute talk by someone with clinical
experience, as a clinician or service user or both, followed by a 5‐ to
10‐minute response from a philosopher and then discussion.
In this paper, we summarize the talks and responses, giving a fla-
vour of the discussion and drawing some general conclusions. Five
detailed papers, each based on one of the presentations given at this
workshop, also appear in this issue,6-10 and 3 papers on the workshop
theme have appeared in the previous philosophy thematic.11-13 A
podcast is available on the website of the Self‐Control and the Person
group, at http://www.selfcontrolandtheperson.weebly.com/podcasts.
2 | SESSION 1: DEMENTIA
Juliette Brown, a psychiatrist specializing in General Adult and Older
Adult Psychiatry in the East London NHS Foundation Trust, opened
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the day by asking how the experience of dementia affects an individ-
ual's sense of self and personal identity over the course of time. She
began by describing some of the apparent effects on selfhood and
identity may accompany dementia and argued that, although dementia
is often seen as synonymous with loss, the illness can also deliver
remarkable insights into the capacity to navigate a fragmented identity,
as well as reminding us vividly of the importance of a relational, inter-
active quality to identity. For those with personal experience of
dementia and also within our wider culture, Brown explained dementia
represents an archetype of loss of self and identity over time, which
brings great sorrow and is rightly often met with horror, sadness, and
shock.14 All of the dementias and the fear of the late stages, with their
overwhelming need and dependency, can impede any positive thinking
concerning the intervening years and the possibility of living and dying
better with dementia.
Dementia forces us to confront the possibility of living with a
fragmented identity and the extent to which we all rely on a notion of
psychological continuity, presenting ourselves to ourselves as a coherent
self over time and creating a fiction around consistency.15 Brown drew
on the ideas of a broad range of thinkers to question this fiction, ranging
from Hume's view of identity as no more than a series of perceptions
over time to ideas found in postmodern, post‐structuralist, and particu-
larly continental psychoanalytic thought that the self we experience is
a (necessary) fiction.16 Dementia demonstrates that we can develop
beyond the need or capacity for continuity and coherence.
Moreover, dementia highlights the relational element of selfhood,
as we witness the adaptive, socially constructed self diminishing
through the disease and a second, experiential self, comes to promi-
nence.17 Via Levinas and Lacan, we might ethically consider, instead,
the relationship between development, mastery, and anxiety in rela-
tion to a post‐memory, post‐language self that evolves in the course
of dementia.18,19 Brown argued that, if we can move beyond our con-
ventional notions of selfhood, we may be able to face the radical chal-
lenge dementia poses to selfhood. Psychodynamic insights might help
us to understand the responses of people with dementia and their
carers to their new realities and to support people with dementia to
face the diagnosis. Perhaps, then we can negotiate the altered sense
of self and fragmentation and find creative ways to persist in our rela-
tionships with those with dementia.
Agniesszka Jaworska, Professor of Philosophy at UC Riverside,
took up the issues of discontinuity and fragmentation, asking what
we should do about the conflict between the dementia patient's earlier
and later self, when there is a mismatch between a patient's advance
wishes and their current best interests. She asked what justifies
Dworkin's notion of precedent autonomy, in which “a competent per-
son's right to autonomy requires that his past decisions about how
he is to be treated if he becomes demented be respected even if they
contradict the desires he has at a later point.”20
Jaworska argued that lack of decision‐making capacity may well
be insufficient to justify precedent autonomy, given that early or
pre‐dementia patients are unable to understand what their best inter-
ests will be once they start suffering from severe dementia because
of the unknown nature of the experience. Nevertheless, she sug-
gested the possibility of a threshold of degeneration so severe in
terms of the concerns on which an advanced directive was based that
it might justify implementation of the directive, even though decision‐
making capacity itself may have actually been lost at a much earlier
point.
The discussion centred on the topic of personality change and
whether, for example, changes in behaviour constitute alterations of
fundamental personality. Participants reflected on the extent to which
continuity of identity diminishes and how far this is reflected in others'
or the person's own view of themselves.
3 | SESSION 2: AFFECTIVE DISORDERS
Julia Bland, Consultant Medical Psychotherapist at the South London
and Maudsley NHS Trust, began her presentation by suggesting that
one central question in this area concerns how the formerly ill person
now relates to themselves. There is often a fundamental shift, she sug-
gests, from the premorbid state of common sense assumptions about
continuity of self along lines that, “I may have good and bad days, but
I remain myself throughout my life.” The person living through an expe-
rience such as psychotic depression (absolutely convinced that the psy-
chiatric nurses are planning to torture them with snakes and spiders,
which they believe they richly deserve) is in a new state. When fully
recovered, there is a discontinuity between the sick and the well self,
which must be accommodated, tolerated, and somehow made sense of.
To explore these questions further, Bland took the audience through
a brief history of ideas about the self (including references herein21-23).
She noted that there has been much emphasis within philosophy on the
continuity of psychological features such as memory, beliefs, values, per-
sonality, and preferences as facilitating the continuity of the self over time.
She then pointed out that a theory of selfhood must, however, also allow
for change over time and that this raises the question, “how much of your
personality could you lose and still be you?” She noted also that these
ideas are challenged from other perspectives including Buddhism, which
reifies the dissolution of self as an ideal, raising another question, “Do
we overvalue both psychological coherence and self?”
Bland explained that she is persuaded by a theory according to
which we have no static selves but are in a constantly fluctuating state
of becoming and actively constructing ourselves, in a way that is
dependent on the social environment. She also proposed that the idea
of an internal dialogue between different parts of the self is extremely
apt clinically, giving the example of Freud in “Mourning and Melancho-
lia” describing the hostile attack of the highly critical part (called super-
ego by Freud) and the struggling self.24
Connecting these ideas to the therapeutic task, Bland moved on to
the experience of the self in affective disorder. She noted that at the
milder end of low mood, there may be no radical disturbance in the
sense of self, unlike the terror of disintegration that is part of psychotic
depression. Part of the therapeutic work that can be done, she
suggests, facilitates an adjustment to a new identity, which includes a
vulnerability to a mood disorder, even if there is no discontinuity in
the self. In other contexts, the therapeutic task is to support the repair
of a painful “split” in the psyche that might be caused by a childhood
trauma, which undermined the development of a coherent self.
In this therapeutic process, Bland suggests that narrative becomes
crucial: The central offering is the co‐construction of a narrative of the
self that makes the terrifying and inexplicable take its place and thus
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become bearable. This “dialogical self” is a fluctuating movement around
a central core, which we each construct in inner dialogue between parts
of ourselves, and outer dialogues with others in social contexts.
In her response, Jillian Craigie, an ethicist at King's College
London, focused on a central idea in Bland's presentation that the
healthy state is characterized by a continuity and coherence and men-
tal ill health is characterized by a rupture in the self.25 Craigie contin-
ued Bland's exploration of this idea by drawing in particular on the
work of David Velleman.26
Velleman, rightly in her view, worries about the idea seemingly
implicit in coherence models such as Harry Frankfurt's that problem-
atic emotions (those experienced as alien and not reflectively
endorsed) should be repressed.27 She notes that Velleman wonders
whether this kind of response to incoherence within the self might
even contribute to mental ill health. Could our striving for coherence
and consistency undermine our mental health?
In close connection with Bland's ideas about the self, Craigie
described how Velleman pushes back against monolithic notions of a true
self that must be sustained over time, urging us embrace multidimension-
ality and complexity in our understanding of self. This presents a model of
developmental achievement that does not involve the resolution of
inconsistency, as many philosophers would have us believe is the ideal.
The discussion that followed revolved around question whether
the proposed discontinuity in the self in affective disorder was a differ-
ence in kind or simply in degree, relative to ordinary experience. Bland
was asked whether any particular philosophers had helped her in this
area and suggested that different ideas were helpful in different con-
texts but that no particular theorist stood out.
4 | SESSION 3: BIPOLAR DISORDER
Clare Dolman, journalist and part‐time PhD student at the Institute of
Psychiatry, Psychology & Neuroscience, KCL, spoke from both a per-
sonal and a researcher's perspective on various aspects of bipolar dis-
order and identity: The effect of diagnosis, the relationship between
the self in manic, depressive, and euthymic episodes, and the impact
of the passage of time on memory and identity in bipolar disorder.
Dolman said that her first hospitalization and diagnosis caused a
massive shift in identity, from being an ambitious and driven person
to being a “mentally ill person” who would need to take medication
the rest of her life to stay “sane” and who could not talk about it
because of the stigma. The disorder affected how she saw her past
and future. She reassessed important events and periods of her life
in the light of the diagnosis. She was no longer sure she could become
the sort of person she had imagined she would be: a high flying career
woman and, even more importantly, a mother.
Dolman also explored how bipolar disorder fundamentally
impacts identity. One of the definitions of the word “identity” is
“the state or fact of remaining the same one, as under varying
aspects or conditions.” But bipolar disorder, by its very nature,
involves widely discrepant views of the self during mania, depres-
sion, and normal functioning, ranging from inflated self‐esteem and
grandiosity to feelings of worthlessness. In particular, people with
bipolar disorder see themselves differently during manic episodes
than they do when they recall the episode from a euthymic state.28
This leads to a conundrum: They take pills to stop themselves from
turning into “a different person”—one who they may think is more
quick‐witted and energetic, more gregarious and attractive, but also
less sensitive to other people's feelings, who can behave incredibly
badly and generally become very irritating. Does the lithium keep
them who they truly are or does it subdue a version of themselves,
and a more creative one at that?29,30
Bipolar disorder also impacts on the relationship between memory
and identity. Dolman is particularly interested in how the passage of
time affects one's perception of self. We all construct our memories,
which cumulatively contribute to our developing sense of identity. But
people with bipolar disorder may interpret a formative moment differ-
ently depending on whether they are manic, depressive, or euthymic
when they recall it. So the process of constructing self through memory
will be more complex for with bipolar disorder, as their minds accommo-
date traces of several different interpretations of every event, each
loaded with emotional salience, which go on accumulating over time.
Finally, Dolman noted that her psychiatrist did not believe manic
depressives (as bipolar disorder was then called) needed anything but
medication to return them to “normal.” However, she thinks therapy
can be extremely helpful—even essential—for people who receive a
diagnosis of bipolar disorder. As well as taking the medication, they
need to come to terms with the need to take it, and it helps if they
can somehow assimilate the condition into their identity and make it
a positive as well as a negative.
Wayne Martin, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Essex,
talked about how bipolar disorder can help us to understand personal
identity, a key topic in philosophy. He distinguished between 2 fram-
ings of personal identity. On the forensic version, personal identity is
a fact of the matter. We care about it because we use forensic identity
to impute guilt for earlier actions, to enforce contracts on later selves,
and to establish the legitimacy of advance directives. Theories of what
underlines forensic identity include bodily continuity and memory. On
an existential understanding, personal identity is a task to be accom-
plished or a status. We care about it because an existential identity is
a psychological need and a social requirement. On this understanding,
achieving personal identity is a kind of work.
Martin identified problems for existential identity. The Problem of
the Starting Point is that personal identity requires that I do some work
(“integration”) but how can I do that work unless identity is already
accomplished? The Problem of the End Point is that working towards
personal identity presupposes some standards of success or failure,
but what are these? He argued that we can get clues to the answers
from bipolar disorder. Regarding the Problem of the Starting Point,
personal identity is incipient in identity‐implicating moods and attune-
ments, such as feelings of guilt and regret. Regarding the Problem of
the End Point, achieving personal identity requires making sense of
the episodes as parts of a whole.
Discussion focused on the surprising inapplicability of a “two‐per-
son” model, where the patient is considered to be different persons in
the manic and depressive phases. Although it is superficially appealing,
sufferers feel emotions like shame and regret about episodes once
they have passed, which suggests a continued sense of identity
between the different phases. It was suggested that bipolar patients
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have to accept that the person during the episode is them in some
respects—to own their episodes and accept that they could do those
things—and that the notion of “taking responsibility” could bear more
philosophical scrutiny.
5 | SESSION 4: PSYCHOSIS
Eduardo Iacoponi, Consultant Psychiatrist at the South London and
Maudsley NHS, explained why his main experience with patients suf-
fering from psychosis is not actually of change but of an absence of
and perhaps even a resistance to change. In the majority of cases, he
sees patients without being invited. After attempting to establish basic
facts to ascertain the presence and type of psychiatric problem, his
therapeutic mission is to help to eliminate symptoms, to achieve func-
tional and occupational recovery.
A typical clinical encounter pits friends, relatives, and clinicians
against the patient. Friends and relatives see the patient's identity as
disrupted, while clinicians immediately present their primary objective
as ridding the patient of the psychosis, which is judged as wholly
negative. By contrast, the patients do not accept this view and cling
to their psychotic beliefs, asserting that they have always been as they
are now. Thus, Iacoponi associates psychosis with a lack of change, a
clinging to essential aspects of identity, and wonders whether part of
psychosis might actually be a desperate resistance to change.
To illustrate these ideas, Iacoponi described some case studies.
One patient thinks she is the mother of Christ; another that her brain
is being monitored by an international atomic agency; a third that his
relatives were impostors who were fiddling with the internet and
poisoning his food. The patient who believes herself to be monitored
says that, despite the fear this causes, the worst and most intolerable
possible outcome would be to find her beliefs to be mistaken.
In Iacoponi's third case study, the patient eventually retreats into
himself and becomes passive and accommodating, appearing to lose
all interest in external activities. Most challenging, perhaps, are such
patients who, ultimately, overwhelmed by “negative symptoms,” fall
into a lack of the energy, which could maintain the hope of change.
He drew a comparison with the nymph Daphne in the Ovid's tale of
Daphne and Apollo, who asks to be transformed into a tree, so as to
resist Apollo and remain a virgin. Perhaps, he speculated, to talk about
identity over time in psychosis, we need to think of more than one
identity, and of the relationship between a core and essential identity
that must remain, and an external, malleable one that will adapt and
protect according to need.
In response, Tania Gergel, a philosopher at the Centre for Men-
tal Health, Ethics and Law at King's, suggested that contemporary
philosophical notions of selfhood and personal identity are a poor
fit when it comes to accommodating the radical transformations
of identity, which occur with psychotic disorders. Reflecting on
Iacoponi's case studies, she focused on the way in which psychotic
delusions come on fairly suddenly, with no major explanation
beyond pathology and cause, in effect, almost a complete fracturing
between the pre‐ and post‐psychosis self. Core delusional beliefs
alone are valued and become the key element of identity. Interac-
tion with others becomes, essentially, a combative relationship, in
which the need to prove the legitimacy of this new reality is all that
matters.
Within the context of the reductionist notion of personal iden-
tity, in which our continuing identity simply is constituted by the
psychological connectedness between ourselves at the different
moments of our lives,31,32 or the narrativist view of identity as some
type of teleological coherence drawing the various moments of our
lives together,33,34 it is hard to see where the psychotic “fracturing”
of identity could fit in. If we stick to such models, we may simply
have to concede that, for Iacoponi's patients, especially those in
whom the psychosis is most refractory, the onset of psychosis con-
stitutes the loss of self. More worryingly, perhaps, in legal or ethical
terms, such a view may lead us to see psychosis as the loss or dimi-
nution of personhood. To find, therefore, some way in which identity
and personhood can be maintained within psychotic disorders, it
seems that we need an alternative or adapted conceptual model of
identity over time.
A key topic within the discussion was the tension between iden-
tity as the individual with psychosis sees themselves and their identity
or loss of identity as it is perceived by others. If we try to find some
way to accommodate the changes by concentrating on “character,”
as opposed to selfhood, what do we do with the “person” as they are
known by others? Despite the certainty of the individual, is the psy-
chotic self itself “disordered,” and how do family, friends, and clinicians
navigate the way in which their views of the individual are now seen,
primarily, as a threat?
6 | SESSION 5: BORDERLINE PERSONALITY
DISORDER
Angel Santos, Consultant Psychiatrist and trained psychotherapist
from the South London and Maudsley NHS Trust, contrasted the dis-
continuity that arises from psychosis with the general disorder and
chaos of self that is associated with personality disorders, especially
Borderline Personality Disorder. Borderline Personality Disorder is
characterized by a self that does not develop properly; by extreme
emotional sensitivity, which can be compared to the physical sensitiv-
ity of a person with burns; and by rapid changes in mood, which
patients feel no control over.
From a psychoanalytic point of view, there are theories of Borderline
Personality Disorder, Kernberg's analysis based on object‐relationship
theory35 and Fonagy's theory of mentalization.36-38 While they place dif-
ferent emphases on nature vs nurture and innate aggressive impulses vs
learned deficits in mental processes, both place identity disturbance—and
the inability to create, maintain, and use benign images of self and others
—central to the disorder. In both theories, emotional instability, impulsiv-
ity, and other symptoms are secondary, a result of the sufferer's experi-
ence of an incongruent and unstable self.
However, there is not much empirical work on identity
disturbance and the concept is very diffuse. When Weston and
Wilkinson‐Ryan developed a questionnaire to probe the construct,
based on the theoretical literature and their clinical experience, it had
35 items all examples of what psychiatrists consider to be indications
of identity disturbance.39 They included contradictory beliefs and
1002 GOLD ET AL.
behaviours, personality changes, value changes, feeling empty inside,
and confusion over sexual orientation.
From his clinical experience, Santos made the following observations
about diagnosis and identity. For some patients, a BPD diagnosis pro-
vides a new and useful sense of identity, helping them to make sense
of their experiences and giving them a sense of hope. For others, identi-
fying with the sick role is not useful and they resent it. Many patients
already have a diagnosis of bipolar disorder or post‐traumatic stress dis-
order; they have located their disturbance outside of the self, in a chem-
ical imbalance or an event, which caused everything to go wrong. It can
be hard for them to accept that their problem is internal. The psychiatrist
wants to help them change their narrative, to get them to accept how
their experiences have led to their behaviour and to try to give them a
sense that they can be helped. If the source of the problem is inside
the self, then maybe there is something they can do about it. However,
in that case the patients need to face the experience of loss and of lost
years: “If I can change now, why couldn't I do it ten or twenty years ago?”
Natalie Gold, Senior Research Fellow at King's College London,
explained how, in the non‐clinical population, impulsivity can be seen
as being caused by a focus on me‐now at the expense of the self over
time. BPD seems at first sight to be a pathological version of this, as
the diagnostic criteria include a disordered sense of self and potentially
self‐damaging impulsivity.40 The philosophical framework of
intertemporal agency offers a connection between the subjective feel-
ings of disorder and the objective behaviours.
However, the relationship between philosophical theories of iden-
tity and the disrupted self of BPD patients is not so simple. Amongst
the 35 items identified by Weston and Wilkinson‐Ryan,39 we can find
several senses in which the BPD patient's self is disrupted. BPD
patients can have a sense of not being the same person over time,
changing intentions, the sense of being different selves with different
people, feelings of emptiness, and hatred of themselves. As we go
through this list, we get increasingly far from philosophical accounts
of the changing self over time, and hating oneself even seems to pre-
sume the existence of a persisting self. Some of the items look like dis-
continuities of self, but others look like they are better described as
disunities. What is the relationship between disunity and discontinu-
ity? Might disunity be a type of or cause of discontinuity?
In discussion, we distinguished the philosophical project of per-
sonal identity as articulating what individuates a person over time (or
being the same person) from psychiatric accounts of the development
of identity understood as a set of affiliations (having a sense of iden-
tity). These are different sets of problems: In principle, there could be
someone who has exactly the same commitments and values as me,
but that would still be a different individual. However, the projects
are connected because a severe strain on identity in the psychiatric
sense can cause strain on metaphysical identity.
7 | SESSION 6: ANOREXIA NERVOSA
Lorna Richards, Consultant Psychiatrist, St Ann's Eating Disorders
Service, North London, argued that treating anorexia nervosa purely as
an illness distracts from “the messy stuff inside,” around issues of iden-
tity and values. The most common time of onset is during adolescence
and young adulthood, when patients do not yet have a robust adult
sense of self and are still trying to work out who they are and who they
want to be. Richards explained how anorexia shields them from confu-
sion and offers identity during a time of identity crisis, allowing an unwell
anorexic self to emerge in place of the authentic self.
Patients describe how anorexia becomes integral to their selves,
not necessarily all encompassing, but a part of themselves.41,42
Richards explained how anorexia affects patients' values, their person-
alities, and their ways of thinking. There is a general societal tendency
to associate negative values with fatness, but anorexics go beyond this,
thinking that being fat is a failure and makes them unlovable; they put
paramount importance on being thin, seeing their anorexia as indicat-
ing their superior willpower. They identify with the disorder, which is
part of a broader personality style, and have difficulty envisaging their
future self without anorexia. They worry that getting well would
completely change them, turning them into different people. It would
be a leap into the unknown, since many have never experienced a self
without disorder. So, although patients may want to be free of eating
problems, they do not necessarily want to be free of the disorder itself.
Richards said that these issues are exacerbated by the pro‐ana sub‐cul-
ture, which promotes anorexia as a lifestyle choice. Patients are
looking for an identity and the culture provides a tribal identity, which
legitimizes their anorexia.
According to Richards, the therapist has to try to get patients to
see their anorexia as in battle with the healthy part of themselves, to
get them to try to change. This requires them to tease apart the true
self and the anorexic self.43
Jonathan Glover, Professor of Philosophy at King's College Lon-
don, responded by taking up the question of how we identify authentic
values. He argued that we cannot just discount values because they
are pathological or caused by illness. Nor is it enough that anorexia is
not conducive to things that are important for human beings. Other
acceptable lifestyle choices, such as mountaineering, involve a high risk
of death. Instead, Glover gave possible approaches for identifying
authentic values.
The first was stability, or the tendency of the value to persist in the
long term, over time. To discover which values are stable, we can use
the “thank‐you test”: If you do not want something (or some treat-
ment) at the time but are grateful afterwards, then that suggests your
previous values were not stable and therefore not authentic. However,
whilst Glover argued that the thank‐you test is important evidence of
instability he noted that it must be used with caution because of the
possibility of abuse. For instance, someone's later values can be
changed by torture and brainwashing, as happened to Winston Smith
in Orwell's 1984.
The second approachwas to distinguish between shallow and deep
values. According toGlover, shallow values are not rooted in experience
but are often assumed to please other people. In anorexia, one story is
that patients are pushed into the disorder by controlling parents.44
Pro‐ana websites can help to sustain the disorder. Glover argued that
this causal story suggests that the values associated with anorexia are
not genuine values; the feminine ideal is rather shallow and too other‐
directed to base a life around. He suggested that we can also identity
whether someone is living according to deep values by asking howvalue
conflicts are settled; whether it is just that the strongest desire at the
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moment wins out or whether the person asks deeper questions about
where the desire comes from and whether it really leads to a satisfying
life. For Glover, part of the role of a therapist is to help self‐creation.
We discussed the idea that patients should externalize the condi-
tion, and whether encouraging them to do so is problematic. Richards
said that externalization works really well for some patients but has the
opposite effect on others.
8 | CONCLUSION
The day's discussions focused on a broad range of conditions and a
diversity of challenges in relation to the question of self over time
within these various disorders. Despite this diversity, the centrality
and importance of questions concerning selfhood to the issues that
face individuals who suffer from these disorders clearly emerged from
the day's discussions. A number of the clinicians, both those who
spoke and those who attended, commented that, although questions
relating to identity and self are not a usual part of their clinical practice,
they had found the day's discussions to be useful and illuminating in
terms of possibilities for understanding and engaging their patient pop-
ulation. For the philosophers present, in‐depth discussions about iden-
tity and self within different mental disorders stimulated a
reconsideration of philosophical notions of personal identity.
What constitutes continuity and coherence of the self, and the dif-
ficulties in relation to self various forms of mental disorder, emerged as
key theme. It seems that both philosophical and general conceptions of
psychological continuity and coherence as central to the persistence of
selfhood and identity play a major role in our current understanding
and treatment of those who experience mental disorders. At the same
time, each of the disorders under discussion appears to involve funda-
mental transitions and challenges to these dominant ideas of selfhood
and identity, both in the eyes of the person themselves and those
around them. We may well need, therefore, to expand or find alterna-
tives to our current ways of conceptualizing selfhood and its persis-
tence in an individual over time, if we are to deal with such
transitions and challenges and to avoid consigning those who experi-
ence mental disorder to fragmentation, diminution, or loss of personal
identity.
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